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THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE: WHY RLUIPA’S LAND USE 
PROVISION IS A CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERAL 
ENFORCEMENT POWER 
 
Qasim Rashid♦♥♠ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) 
superseded the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional in its application to states in 1997. A 
two-pronged law, RLUIPA protects prisoners from unjust impositions to 
their freedom of worship and also ensures religious institutions may use 
their property for legitimate worship purposes without burdensome zoning 
law restrictions. This paper focuses specifically on the latter prong and an-
alyzes RLUIPA in light of the growing Islamophobia in America during the 
previous twenty-four months. For example, the United States Department of 
Justice reports “of the eighteen RLUIPA matters involving possible dis-
crimination against Muslims that the Department has monitored since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, eight have been opened since May of 2010.”∗ Additionally, 
this paper repudiates the assertion that RLUIPA is an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of Congressional power, and argues instead RLUIPA ensures effec-
tive and legal protection from religious discrimination for all Americans. 
                                                       
♦ The author is an American-Muslim human rights activist, writer, and lecturer on American-Islamic 
issues. He received his Bachelor of Science in Marketing from the University of Illinois at Chicago 
(2006) and his juris doctor from the University of Richmond School of Law (2012), where he served as 
Executive Editor of the Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business and Founder and President of the 
Muslim Law Students Association. Send all questions and inquiries to q.rashid@richmond.edu. 
♥ My deepest gratitude to Rachel Reynolds, 2011-12 Editor-in-Chief of the Richmond Journal of Law 
and the Public Interest. Her leadership, commitment to human rights and religious freedom, and passion 
for the subject matter proved an inspiration throughout this paper’s development. 
♠ This paper is dedicated to my wonderful wife, Ayesha, and beautiful son, Hassan. 
∗ U.S. Dep’t of Justice, REPORT OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS 
LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 13 (Sept. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/rluipa_report_092210.pdf. 
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“In reviewing the history of the times through which we have passed, no 
portion of it gives greater satisfaction, on reflection, than that which pre-
sents the efforts of the friends of religious freedom, and the success with 
which they are crowned.”+ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
President Bill Clinton signed The Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) into law on September 22, 2000, after it 
passed unanimously through both the House and the Senate.1 Congress rec-
ognized that a gap existed between the First Amendment’s freedom of reli-
gion protection and a tangible enforcement measure to ensure religious or-
ganizations did not suffer under the guise of what appeared to be a local or 
state government’s legitimate economic reasons.2 In the decade since 
RLUIPA was enacted, Americans of diverse religious backgrounds have 
filed and won suits using the RLUIPA defense, demonstrating both the need 
for RLUIPA and its effectiveness. For example, the New York Times re-
ported that RLUIPA challenges 
…have been filed by a Sikh society that wants to build a temple in a low-
density residential area of Yuba City, Calif.[,] a Hindu congregation seek-
ing permission to expand its temple and cultural center on a busy highway 
in Bridgewater, N.J.[,] and a Muslim organization that has been trying for 
years to build a mosque on land that the local government in Wayne Town-
ship, N.J., now wants to buy for open space.3 
But critics assert that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it allegedly 
requires the government to support a religion over a secular local or state 
government interest, in essence violating the Establishment Clause.4 Like-
wise, critics contend that RLUIPA is not an authorized federal power under 
the Enumerated Powers of Congress.5 
This paper responds to these misunderstandings about RLUIPA. Part II 
                                                       
+ Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the General Meeting of Correspondence of the Sixth 
Baptist Associations (Nov. 21, 1808).   
1 146 CONG. REC. H11947-01, 2000 WL 1777680 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2000); see 146 Cong. Rec. E1563-
01, 2000 WL 1369378 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000).  
2 Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 146 Cong. Rec. S6678-02 (2000), at 21. 
3 Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation As Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2006, at A1. 
4 See Marci Hamilton, Struggling With Churches as Neighbors: Land Use Conflicts 
Between Religious Institutions and Those Who Reside Nearby, FINDLAW.COM (Jan. 17, 2002), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020117.html. 
5 See id.  
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of this paper describes the motivations behind developing RLUIPA and 
how it protects religious institutions in particular. It also describes the re-
sponsibilities RLUIPA imposes upon local and state governments. Part III 
responds to multiple criticisms of RLUIPA, particularly that it is an over-
reach of the federal government’s powers, that it is an impermissible use of 
power outside the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that it violates the Establishment Clause. Further, this section delves specif-
ically into the increased anti-Muslim sentiment in America, sometimes col-
loquially dubbed “Islamophobia,” and demonstrates how this reality further 
legitimizes RLUIPA’s necessity. Finally, to demonstrate RLUIPA’s limits 
of application and appropriate functionality, this section analyzes several 
notable case studies in which the RLUIPA defense was employed. Part IV 
concludes this paper, reaffirming that RLUIPA is, in fact, a necessary and 
proper use of federal power and serves a substantive constitutional purpose 
to support religious freedom in America. 
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF RLUIPA 
A. What is RLUIPA? 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(“RLUIPA”)6 developed from the failed Religious Freedom and Restoration 
Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).7 In 1997, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA in 
its application to states in Boerne v. Flores, holding that it was an unconsti-
tutional use of Congress’s enforcement power.8 The Court held that while 
Congress has the right to enact “remedial or preventative legislation,” that 
legislation must show “congruence and proportionality” between the viola-
tions it wanted to rectify and the means chosen to rectify those violations.9 
In other words, RFRA was held unconstitutional because Congress assumed 
a power reserved exclusively to the Court: the power to define the substan-
tive rights that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. In his opinion, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote: 
Congress’ power under § 5, however, extends only to “enforc[ing]” the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this 
power as “remedial.” The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are 
                                                       
6 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc – cc5 (2000).  For the text 
of the statute relating specifically to land use, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.  
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).   
8 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
9 Id. at 517, 520.  
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inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legis-
lation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said 
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right 
by changing what the right is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not 
the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it 
not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any 
meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”10 
While the RFRA was held unconstitutional as it applied to local and state 
governments, it still currently applies to the federal government. This fact 
was reaffirmed in the 2006 case of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benefi-
cente Uniao do Vegetal.11 Once the Supreme Court ruled RFRA unconstitu-
tional as it applied to states, several states created their own statutes mod-
eled after RFRA to achieve a similar purpose.12 But the demand for a 
federal law to address what RFRA could not address on a state level still 
existed. Thus, the Boerne ruling ultimately led to the development, passage, 
and enactment of RLUIPA. Unlike RFRA, Congress developed RLUIPA 
under the Taxing and Spending Clause,13 arguing that it was constitutional 
to require local and state governments that receive federal funding to modi-
fy their land use laws to accommodate religious freedom.14 
 
B. How Does RLUIPA Apply? 
RLUIPA was thus designed specifically to avoid the pitfalls that led to 
the RFRA’s inapplicability to local and state zoning ordinances.15 RLUIPA 
                                                       
10 Id. at 519.  
11 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006) (ruling unan-
imously against the federal government, stating that the Government must show a compelling state in-
terest in restricting religious freedom, including restriction on the use of an otherwise illegal substance 
in a religious ceremony).  
12 See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 466, 474–77 (2010). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”). 
14 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The Spending Clause 
provisions are modeled directly on similar provisions in other civil rights laws. Congressional power to 
attach germane conditions to federal spending has long been upheld.”) 
15 146 CONG. REC. S7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 reflects our commitment to protect religious freedom and 
our belief that Congress still has power to enhance that freedom, even after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in 1997 that struck down the broader Religious Freedom Restoration Act that 97 Senators joined in 
passing in 1993.”) 
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requires local and state governments to avoid implementing zoning re-
strictions on religious institutions that would substantially burden their 
freedom of worship;16 however, RLUIPA is not an exception to all zoning 
restrictions on religious institutions. Local and state governments may still 
implement zoning restrictions if they demonstrate that the burden on the re-
ligious assembly or institution is both in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernment interest and also the least restrictive means to further that compel-
ling interest.17 Any local or state government receiving federal funds, even 
for general purposes, is held liable to this RLUIPA standard.18 Under an 
equality principle, RLUIPA ultimately strives to ensure that “[n]o govern-
ment shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a 
nonreligious assembly or institution.”19 As such, RLUIPA ensures that no 
government shall implement a land use regulation that discriminates against 
a religious organization, categorically excludes a religious organization 
from any jurisdiction, or unreasonably limits them within a jurisdiction.20 
When a religious organization files a RLUIPA complaint against the 
government, the court first determines whether RLUIPA even applies. 
RLUIPA applies if the plaintiff religious organization can demonstrate that 
the government’s land use regulation places a substantial burden on the or-
ganization’s religious practice.21 To date, five federal circuits have heard 
RLUIPA-related cases, and regardless of whether they have held for or 
against the plaintiff religious organization, each has applied a different test 
to determine whether a RLUIPA violation occurred.22  
The most common complaint is a violation of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
clause.23 Religious organizations alleging an Equal Terms violation are 
simply claiming that the local or state government is applying a different 
standard to them than is applied to a secular organization.24 To determine if 
this claim is valid, courts directly compare the rights afforded to the re-
stricted religious institution filing the complaint to that of non-religious in-
                                                       
16 See 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(1).   
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A) – (B). 
18 Id.  
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A) – (B). 
20 Id.  
21 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-2(b) (2010)). 
22 See generally Elijah Grp., Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 422–23 (5th Cir. 2011) (discuss-
ing the various tests used by the Eleventh Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Third Circuit, and Second Circuit to 
determine RLUIPA violations, before ultimately applying a hybrid test to hold for the church plaintiff). 
23 42 U.S.C § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000). 
24 See § 2000cc(b)(1).   
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stitutions that have been permitted to function under the zoning ordinances, 
also known as the comparators.25  
The Eleventh Circuit held that determining whether an entity is a com-
parator is based on whether the challenged zoning ordinance is facially neu-
tral or facially discriminatory.26 If the ordinance is determined to be facially 
discriminatory, the entity is determined to be a comparator; this renders vir-
tually every non-religious institution as a comparator, but the Eleventh Cir-
cuit does not deem this alone as a prima facie case of a RLUIPA violation.27 
Instead, it applies an additional strict scrutiny review to make that determi-
nation.28 Commenting on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on facially neutral 
zoning ordinances, however, the Fifth Circuit states: 
When alleging “religious gerrymander,” a religious plaintiff must show 
that “the challenged zoning regulation separates permissible from imper-
missible assemblies or institutions in a way that burdens almost only reli-
gious uses”—thus assessing the treatment of the religious plaintiff relative 
to all other nonreligious occupants. When alleging discriminatory applica-
tion, however, a religious plaintiff must show that “a similarly situated non-
religious comparator received differential treatment under the challenged 
regulation.”29 
This test essentially looks at both the religious and non-religious organi-
zations to determine if the non-religious organization received different 
treatment under the same zoning ordinance. 
The Third and Seventh Circuits apply a less complex test—one that does 
not ask whether the zoning ordinance is facially discriminatory or facially 
neutral.30 The Third Circuit held in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism v. 
City of Long Branch, “a regulation will violate the Equal Terms provision 
only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions less well than secular as-
semblies or institutions that are similarly situated as to the regulatory pur-
                                                       
25 See Elijah Grp., 643 F.3d at 422 (holding that “[i]n prohibiting the government from treating a reli-
gious institution ‘on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution,’ the Clause by its 
nature requires that the religious institution in question be compared to a nonreligious counterpart, or 
‘comparator.’”). 
26 Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
27 See id. at 1308–09, 1311. 
28 See id. at 1309. 
29 Elijah Grp., Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Primera Iglesia 
Bautista Hispana of Boca Ration, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
30 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007); River of 
Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, Ill., 611 F. 3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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pose.”31 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit held in an en banc ruling that a gov-
ernment’s zoning ordinance is in violation of the Equal Terms Clause if it 
treats a religious organization on less than equal terms than a nonreligious 
organization that is situated similarly in regards to “accepted zoning crite-
ria.”32  
The Second Circuit applies a hybrid test of sorts. It first determines if a 
religious organization and nonreligious comparator are engaging in activi-
ties that are legal under the relevant zoning ordinance in question.33 Next 
and finally, it determines if both the religious organization and the nonreli-
gious comparator receive equal treatment for their legal activities.34 If so, 
then no RLUIPA violation has occurred; if the religious organizations have 
not received equal treatment, then the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing 
a prime facie case of a RLUIPA violation. 
The Fifth Circuit also applies a generally straightforward test, holding in 
Elijah Group, Inc. v. City of Leon Valley that an “ordinance violates 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Clause” if it “treats the [religious organization] on 
terms that are less than equal to the terms on which it treats similarly situat-
ed nonreligious institutions.”35  
Despite the varying tests that different federal circuits apply, a consistent 
theme is that courts determine each RLUIPA claim on a case-by-case ba-
sis.36 The Department of Justice is optimistic that courts will establish a 
more uniform test in the coming years, acknowledging that “different courts 
currently use different tests to determine when a religious assembly is treat-
ed on less than equal terms than a nonreligious assembly or institution un-
der RLUIPA Section 2(b)(1).”37 
Once the plaintiff religious organization has proven that a government’s 
zoning ordinance applies unequally, then it may invoke RLUIPA. To shift 
the burden of defense to the government, the plaintiff religious organization 
must then also prove that the unequal treatment resulted in a substantial 
                                                       
31 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, 510 F.3d at 266 (emphasis in original). 
32 River of Life, 611 F. 3d at 371.  
33 Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667, 670–71 (2d Cir. 
2010).  
34 Id. at 671. 
35 Elijah Grp., Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2011). 
36 See San Jose Christian Coll. v City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004); Civil Liber-
ties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) reh’g en banc denied, 
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24176; DiLaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 471 F.3d 666,  669 (6th Cir. 2006). 
37 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, REPORT OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 13 (Sept. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/rluipa_report_092210.pdf. 
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burden upon its religious practice.38 A mere inconvenience does not become 
a substantial burden unless “the restriction ‘prevents adherents from con-
ducting or expressing their religious beliefs or causes them to forgo reli-
gious precepts.’”39 Proving this substantial burden establishes a prime facie 
case of a RLUIPA violation, but is still not fatal to the government’s zoning 
ordinance. Instead, once the plaintiff shifts the burden to the government, 
the government may choose to rebut.40 
Should the government choose to rebut the presumption that their zoning 
ordinance has caused a RLUIPA violation, it must meet two criteria: 
demonstrate that the zoning ordinance fulfills a compelling government in-
terest and demonstrate that the zoning ordinance was the least restrictive 
means by which to fulfill that compelling interest.41 If the government is 
able to meet both these burdens, then the court will uphold the govern-
ment’s zoning ordinance.42 If, however, the government fails to demonstrate 
either of these requirements, the plaintiff religious organization stands suc-
cessful in its claim, and stands to receive appropriate judgment.43 
With this brief background of RLUIPA’s application, we move to the 
crux of this paper. In 2005, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the “in-
stitutionalized persons” provision of RLUIPA44 and numerous Circuit 
Courts have upheld the “land use” provision.45 Still, critics assert that 
RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it is an overreach of the federal gov-
ernment’s powers, that it is an impermissible use of power outside the scope 
of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it violates the Estab-
lishment Clause. The next section responds to these arguments in detail. 
                                                       
38 See, e.g., Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore Cnty., 
962 A.2d 404, 426–27 (Md. 2008) (determining that a land use regulation and religious exercise exist 
before considering wither the regulation is a “substantial burden” on the religious exercise).   
39 See id. at 429 (citing Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F. Supp. 2d 
507, 515 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding that a zoning restriction that forbade excessively large signs is not a 
RLUIPA violation because the church had other ways of advertising and could have placed the sign on 
another street). 
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000). 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
42 See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1225. 
43 Id. 
44 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-21 (2005). 
45 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005); Sts. Constantine 
& Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2005); Midrash, 
366 F.3d at 1239-40; United States v. Maui Cnty., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (D. Haw. 2003); Free-
dom Baptist Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 874 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  
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III. RLUIPA IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NECESSARY DUE TO THE RISE OF 
ISLAMOPHOBIA 
Professor Marci A. Hamilton, author of God vs. the Gavel: Religion and 
the Rule of Law, is one of RLUIPA’s leading critics.46 Prior to RLUIPA’s 
enactment, Professor Hamilton successfully represented the City of Boerne, 
Texas, in City of Boerne v. Flores,47 the case in which the Supreme Court 
ruled RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to local and state governments.48  
Professor Hamilton’s objections to RLUIPA can be summarized in the 
following two points. First, Professor Hamilton contends that RLUIPA’s 
“federal takeover of local land use control constitutes an obvious violation 
of the Constitution's federalism.”49 She argues, “[i]f land use is not an in-
herently local concern, then virtually nothing is.”50 Next, Professor Hamil-
ton argues that, “RLUIPA…constitutes an establishment of religion on the 
part of Congress, for it systematically favors religious organizations over 
their secular neighbors.”51 These arguments are certainly not exclusively 
Professor Hamilton’s arguments, nor are they comprehensive of all argu-
ments against RLUIPA. But, they represent the general objections that 
RLUIPA critics propagate.52 
 
A. RLUIPA Is Valid Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, “[t]he Congress shall 
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this ar-
ticle.”53 RFRA was largely ruled unconstitutional as it applied to state and 
local governments because the Court felt that Congress took too much liber-
ty in its understanding of Section 5 authority.54 While Justice Kennedy 
                                                       
46 Profile: Marci A. Hamilton, CARDOZO LAW (Nov. 12, 2007) 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd=ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&
userid=10510.  
47 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997). 
48 Id. at 536. 
49 Hamilton, supra note 4. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 See, e.g., Adam McLeod, Whither the Constitution?, LAND USE PROF BLOG (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2011/10/whither-the-constitution.html (discussing critics’ 
arguments that RLUIPA violates the principles of federalism); Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware 
Cnty. v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (Plaintiff alleging that RLUIPA 
violates the Establishment Clause).   
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
54 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). 
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opined on the leeway afforded to Congress under Section 5 as ensuring 
Congress had “wide latitude in determining” whether its actions are reme-
dial or substantive in nature,55 this wide latitude was not enough to apply 
RFRA to local and state governments. In Boerne, the Court held: 
It is difficult to maintain that [the anecdotes in the record] are examples 
of legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened 
religious practices or that they indicate some widespread pattern of reli-
gious discrimination in this country. Congress' concern was with the inci-
dental burdens imposed, not the object or the purpose of legislation.56 
Thus, in Boerne, the Court sought more than mere anecdotes of potential 
discrimination to justify the legislation. Although it endorsed the general 
purpose of the legislation itself, the Court determined that Congress had not 
shown the necessity for such a sweeping law.57 While the Court’s position 
may have been accurate in 1997, when RFRA was held unconstitutional as 
applied to state and local governments, this position is not accurate today, 
as evidenced by the growth of the “Islamophobia Industry” (discussed in 
the next section). 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment affords the federal government 
the right to enforce RLUIPA to ensure American-Muslims are protected 
from the growing widespread pattern of religious discrimination in Ameri-
ca. Contrary to critical assertions that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not afford the federal government the right to enforce RLUIPA, 
“[a]ll circuit courts and almost all district courts which have considered this 
issue have found that RLUIPA is a constitutional use of congressional pow-
er under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”58 In Lighthouse Com-
munity Church of God v. City of Southfield, the court held that: 
…under Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the 
power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that as 
such, Congress has the power to determine legislation necessary to secure 
the guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Conse-
                                                       
55 Id. at 519. 
56 Id. at 531. 
57 Id. at 532, 534–35 (“Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to 
be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA 
applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry.”).  
48 Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God v. City of Southfield, No. 05-40220, 2007 WL 30280, at *10 (E.D. 
Mich. 2007); see Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2006); Sts. 
Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 
2005); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F. 3d 1214, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Maui County, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (D. Haw. 2003); Freedom Baptist Church v. Twp. of 
Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 874 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
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quently, Congress had the authority to enact RLUIPA.59 
The court further established RLUIPA’s legitimacy by stating: “Since the 
Court finds that RLUIPA is a constitutional exercise of congressional pow-
er under the Fourteenth Amendment, it need not consider whether RLUIPA 
is also a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause.”60 In addition, courts have conceded that while 
RLUIPA intrudes to some degree on local land use decisions, RLUIPA 
does not violate principles of federalism if it is otherwise grounded in the 
Constitution. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
Because RLUIPA is a proper exercise of Congress’s power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, there is no violation of the Tenth Amendment. 
Moreover, RLUIPA must not “compel the States to enact or enforce a fed-
eral regulatory program.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); 
New York, 505 U.S. at 175-77, 188. While RLUIPA may preempt laws that 
discriminate against or exclude religious institutions entirely, it leaves indi-
vidual states free to eliminate the discrimination in any way they choose, so 
long as the discrimination is actually eliminated. See Fed. Energy Regulato-
ry Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982) (“[T]he Federal gov-
ernment may displace state regulation even though this serves to ‘curtail or 
prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting sub-
jects the States may consider important.”) (citation omitted); City of Rome 
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (contemplating Fourteenth 
Amendment interference with state rights); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 468 (1991) (same).61 
Critics might continue to assert that the reason why RLUIPA’s land use 
provision has not been ruled unconstitutional is because the question of its 
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has not yet reached 
the Supreme Court.  The fact is, however, that the reason why the question 
has not reached the Supreme Court is because all circuit courts and virtually 
all district courts have consistently ruled RLUIPA constitutional.62 Thus, as 
far as our judiciary is concerned, no debate exists for the Supreme Court to 
                                                       
49 Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God, No. 05-40220, 2007 WL 30280 at *10. 
50 Id.  
51 Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1242.  
62 See, e.g., Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God, No. 05-40220, 2007 WL 30280, at *10 (applying Cutter 
v. Wilkinson to RLUIPA, thus holding the RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause); 
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. Of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 355 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the Lemon 
Test to hold that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism 
v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 336 F.3d 1214, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth Amendment).   
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finalize; RLUIPA is a constitutional power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
 
B. RLUIPA Is Necessary to Combat the Growing Islamophobia Industry 
RLUIPA plays a substantial role in protecting the legitimate land use 
rights of religious minorities, often because of the growing systemic dis-
crimination against, for example, the American-Muslim community—
discrimination that goes far beyond “mere anecdotes.” The reality is that Is-
lamophobia is a growing phenomenon in the United States, warranting leg-
islation as assertive as RLUIPA. For example, the Southern Poverty Law 
Center (“SPLC”) reports that “Anti-Muslim hate groups are a relatively 
new phenomenon in the United States, most of them appearing in the after-
math of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.”63 Re-
call that RFRA was held unconstitutional as it applied to local and state 
governments in 1997—four years prior.64 SPLC adds that: 
The number of anti-Muslim groups tripled in 2011, jumping from 10 
groups in 2010 to 30 last year. That rapid growth in Islamophobia, marked 
by the vilification of Muslims by opportunistic politicians and anti-Muslim 
activists, began in August 2010, when controversy over a planned Islamic 
cultural center in lower Manhattan reached a fever pitch.65 
The infamous “Ground Zero” mosque opposition was led by anti-Islam 
bloggers Pamela Geller66 and Robert Spencer.67  The Anti-Defamation 
League (“ADL”) reports that in 2010, Geller and Spencer united to lead 
“Stop Islamization of America” (“SIOA”).68 The ADL describes SIOA as 
follows: 
Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), created in 2009, promotes a con-
                                                       
52 Intelligence Files: Anti-Muslim, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-files/ideology/anti-muslim (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
64 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
65 Mark Potok, The Patriot Movement Explodes, 145 INTELLIGENCE REPORT (2012), available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/the-year-in-
hate-and-extremism (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (emphasis added). 
66 Intelligence Files: Pamela Geller, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/get- 
informed/intelligence-files/profiles/pamela-geller (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
67 Robert Steinback, The Anti-Muslim Inner Circle, 142 INTELLIGENCE REPORT (2012) available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/summer/the-anti-
muslim-inner-circle. 
68 Backgrounder: Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (March 25, 2011), 
http://www.adl.org/NR/exeres/E8F94C42-4C47-43D3-9957-7EB92CD1015A,8C8C250F-DA79-405F-
B716-D4409CAB5396,frameless.htm. 
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spiratorial anti-Muslim agenda under the guise of fighting radical Islam. 
The group seeks to rouse public fears by consistently vilifying the Islamic 
faith and asserting the existence of an Islamic conspiracy to destroy “Amer-
ican” values. The organization warns of the encroachment of shari’a, or Is-
lamic law, and encourages Muslims to leave what it describes as the “falsity 
of Islam”…Geller and Spencer work closely with David Yerushalmi, an Ar-
izona attorney with a record of anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant and anti-black 
bigotry. Yerushalmi is one of the driving forces behind Shari’a-related con-
spiracy theories and growing efforts to ban or restrict the use of Shari’a law 
in American courts… A main focus of SIOA activity has been the proposed 
Islamic center near Ground Zero.69 
In 2010, SPLC recognized Geller and Spencer’s SIOA organization as an 
official hate group, a title reserved for the most incendiary of groups such 
as the KKK or neo-Nazi organizations.70 Still, Geller and Spencer’s efforts 
to promote intolerance have been remarkably successful; with the assistance 
of David Yerushalmi, they have helped push several “anti-Shariah” bills 
through state legislations.71 The ADL Reports: 
One of the driving forces behind Shari’a-related conspiracy theories and 
growing efforts to ban or restrict the use of Shari’a law in American courts 
is David Yerushalmi…[whose] latest weapon is model anti-Shari’a legisla-
tion he has titled “American Laws for American Courts,” developed for a 
group called the American Public Policy Alliance (APPA). The group 
claims that “one of the greatest threats to American values and liberties to-
day” comes from “foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines,” including “Is-
lamic Shari’ah law,” that have been “infiltrating our court system.” 
Yerushalmi is General Counsel to the Washington, D.C.-based Center for 
Security Policy, founded by Frank J. Gaffney. Gaffney has been active in 
opposing mosque construction and has made several statements about Islam 
that raise concerns. For example, in a 2009 article in the Washington Times, 
Gaffney claimed that “there is mounting evidence that the president not on-
ly identifies with Muslims, but actually may still be one himself.”72 
During the past twenty-four months, over two dozen states have pro-
posed or succeeded in passing state statutes to ban Shariah law (or to ban 
foreign law and therefore include Shariah law), which would in effect pre-
vent Muslims from building mosques, attending worship services, or even 
                                                       
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Intelligence Files: Pamela Geller, supra note 54. 
71 See id.; David Yerushalmi: A Driving Force Behind Anti-Sharia Efforts in U.S., ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE, (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.adl.org/main_Interfaith/david_yerushalmi.htm. 
72 David Yerushalmi, supra note 70 (emphasis added). 
  
280 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XVI:ii 
 
marrying, writing wills, or writing personal contracts based on Islamic 
guidance.73  
Known hate mongers like Geller and Spencer have thus directly influ-
enced numerous state governments. But, a similar story emerges in the fed-
eral government. For example, several members of Congress have openly 
promoted a conspiratorial and baseless campaign to demonize Islam.74 Rep-
resentative Michele Bachmann (R-MN) sent an open letter to the State De-
partment’s inspector general, making meritless accusations against Huma 
Abedin—a high level Clinton aide—of having terrorist ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood.75 Likewise, Representative Allen West (R-FL) has made a 
platform out of demonizing Islam and Muslims, stating that Islam is “not 
[even] a religion, but a ‘theocratic political ideology’ that’s a threat to 
America.”76 More recently, Representative Joe Walsh (R-IL) publicly an-
nounced at a town hall meeting, 
One thing I’m sure of is that there are people in this country – there is a 
radical strain of Islam in this country – it’s not just over there – trying to 
kill Americans every week. It is a real threat, and it is a threat that is much 
more at home now than it was after 9/11. It’s here. It’s in Elk Grove. It’s in 
Addison. It’s in Elgin. It’s here.77 
Within one week of Walsh’s comments, a local mosque had gunshots 
fired upon it78 and another local Muslim school suffered an acid bomb at-
tack.79 He has since not recanted his comments, but rather reaffirmed 
them.80 
That anti-Muslim hate groups tripled in 2011 as compared to 2010 
                                                       
73 See infra Table A. 
74 See, e.g., Michele Bachmann’s Baseless Attack on Huma Abedin, WASH. POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michele-bachmanns-baseless-attack-on-huma-
abedin/2012/07/19/gJQAFhkiwW_story.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). 
75 Id. 
76 Greg Allen, Muslim Activist Challenges Fla. Republican’s Views, NPR (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/27/141359282/muslim-activist-challenges-fla-republicans-views. 
77 Rep. Walsh’s Comments Infuriate Muslims, CBS CHI. (Aug. 10, 2012, 8:04 AM), 
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/08/10/rep-walshs-comments-infuriate-muslims/. 
78 Man Charged After Pellets Fired at Morton Grove Mosque, ABC CHI., 
http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=8770572 (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). 
79 Islamic School Hit With Acid-Filled Bottle in Lombard, CBS CHI. (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/08/13/islamic-school-hit-with-acid-filled-bottle-in-lombard. 
80 See Joe Walsh: Muslims in America, Radical Islam ‘A Threat’ More Now Than After 9/11, 
HUFFINTON POST CHI. (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/joe-walsh-muslims-
in-amer_n_1764034.html (after these town hall comments, Walsh’s office released a statement: “We 
cannot let political correctness blind us to reality.”). 
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should be a major concern for federal and state government.81 Instead, anti-
Muslim sentiment is also prevalent in federal enforcement agencies and the 
New York Police Department (“NYPD”), both of which have come under 
scrutiny for severely incorrect agent training material about Muslims,82 or 
for spying on Muslim students, mosques, and American-Muslim citizens 
without a warrant or even probable cause.83  In fact, after a six-year illegal 
spy ring on American Muslims in New York, the NYPD finally admitted 
that the exercise resulted in zero leads, arrests, charges, or cases of terror-
ism.84 
The stark xenophobia against American Muslims is just as clear as it re-
lates to land use equality. For example, Assistant Attorney General Thomas 
E. Perez stated in his 2011 testimony before Congress:  
Over the last year, we have seen an increase in our RLUIPA cases and investi-
gations involving mosques. Of the 24 RLUIPA matters involving mosques that 
the Department has opened since the law was passed, 14 have been opened 
since May 2010. We believe this reflects a regrettable increase in anti-Muslim 
sentiment.85 
This trend coincides with the SPLC’s report of growing anti-Muslim an-
imus, particularly as a result of the efforts of several anti-Muslim hate 
groups working against the Park51 Islamic center in Manhattan, New 
York.86 This rising bigotry has, in some cases, advanced beyond individual 
discrimination and into open opposition to Muslim communities.87 Since 
2010, another notable mosque in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, faced lawsuits, 
                                                       
81 Potok, supra note 53. 
82 Michael S. Schmidt & Charlie Savage, Language Deemed Offensive is Removed from F.B.I. Training 
Materials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/us/politics/language-deemed-offensive-is-removed-from-fbi-
training-materials.html.  
83 Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Muslim Spying: The Legal and Policy Issues Raised by Widespread Surveillance 
(Q&A), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2012, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/12/nypd-muslim-spying-the-legal-and-policy-issues-raised-by-
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84 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Secret Police Spying on Muslims Led to No Terrorism Leads 
or Cases, GUARDIAN, (Aug. 21, 2012, 9:48AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/21/nypd-
secret-muslim-spying-no-leads.  
85 Protecting the Civil Rights of Muslim Americans: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of 
Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/112-1/03-29-11-crt-perez-testimony-re-protecting-the-civil-rights-
of-muslim-americans.pdf.  
86 Robert Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, 142 INTELLIGENCE REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/summer/jihad-against-
islam.  
87 See, e.g., Elisabeth Kauffman, In Murfreesboro, Tenn.: Church 'Yes,' Mosque 'No', TIME.COM (Aug. 
19, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011847,00.html.  
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threats, vandalism, destruction of property, and attempted arson for wanting 
to expand their facility, even though the local board approved the meas-
ure.88 In 2006, before the Park51 incident, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Com-
munity cancelled their plans to build a mosque in Walkersville, Maryland, 
after local outrage.89 Though the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community decided 
not to challenge the zoning ordinances, the general anti-Muslim fervor was 
clear among the Walkersville community.90 Clark Millison, a Walkersville 
resident, stated, “I don't know that much about Muslims, but I understand 
they want to take over the world and want us all dead.”91 Perhaps best de-
scribing why RLUIPA is needed, Mary Mowen, also a Walkersville resi-
dent stated, “We don't begrudge the right [of Ahmadi Muslims to practice 
their religion]…but we don't feel that Walkersville is the best place [for 
them to do it].”92 
In addition, Chairman of the House Homeland Committee, Representa-
tive Peter King (R-NY), claims “80-85 percent of mosques in this country 
are controlled by Islamic fundamentalists…This is an enemy living 
amongst us.”93 In a September 2007 interview, King added that “[t]here are 
too many mosques in this country...There are too many people sympathetic 
to radical Islam. We should be looking at them more carefully and finding 
out how we can infiltrate them.”94 These comments may influence Ameri-
can citizens who are personally unfamiliar with American Muslims.95 While 
American Muslims comprised only 0.8% of the American population in 
2010, 13.7% of all RLUIPA investigations filed from the inception of 
RLUIPA through September 2010 were classified as “Muslim.”96  
                                                       
88 See id.  
89 Jacqueline L. Salmon, Rejected Muslim Sect Keeps Faith; Ahmadis Thriving in Silver Spring Despite 
Disdain, Fear, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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Far more than mere anecdotes, these contemporary realities more than 
meet the “widespread pattern of religious discrimination in [America]” the 
Court referred to in Boerne.97 Based on these facts alone, RLUIPA is neces-
sary to ensure federal protection of American Muslims’ First Amendment 
right to freedom of worship and Fourteenth Amendment right to equality 
from state and local governments. While anti-pluralism activists such as 
Geller and Spencer will likely continue their efforts to usurp constitutional-
ly guaranteed freedoms for American citizens who happen to be Muslim, it 
is necessary to appreciate the reality of Islamophobia and the effectiveness 
of RLUIPA to combat against this form of domestic extremism. 
 
C. RLUIPA Is Valid Under the Enumerated Powers of Congress 
Critics also argue that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it is not a val-
id exercise of any of the Enumerated Powers of Congress.98 This position is 
also inaccurate based on fundamental Supreme Court precedent.99 
The Constitution affords the federal government the right to determine 
how its funds are used under the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and 
Spending Clause.100  In South Dakota v. Dole, the state of South Dakota 
challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute under the Commerce 
Clause.101 In South Dakota, nineteen-year-old adults were permitted to pur-
chase beer with up to 3.2% alcohol.102 The conflict arose because 23 U.S.C. 
§ 158 directs the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a certain percent-
age of federal highway funds if a state makes it legal for individuals under 
the age of twenty-one to purchase alcoholic drinks.103 South Dakota sued, 
stating § 158 was unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its spending 
powers and the Twenty-First Amendment by passing legislation that made 
receipt of federal highway funds contingent upon the states’ adoption of a 
uniform minimum drinking age.104 
                                                                                                                                
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY SUMMARY REPORT 5 (Trinity Coll. 2009), available at 
http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf (of the fifty-one RLUIPA inves-
tigations, seven were categorized as “Muslim”)); PEW RESEARCH CTR.,THE GLOBAL MUSLIM 
POPULATION 15 (2011) (citing that Muslim comprised 0.8% of the United States population in 2010). 
97 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997). 
98 Hamilton, supra note 4. 
99 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07, 210–11 (1987).   
100 See U.S. CONST., art.1, § 8 cl. 1; U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.   
101 South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 205. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
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In holding § 158 constitutional, the South Dakota Court reasoned that 
Congress acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity 
in states’ drinking ages, which is within constitutional bounds even if Con-
gress cannot regulate a minimum drinking age directly.105 The Court reaf-
firmed that Congress has the right to attach conditions on receipt of federal 
funds, specifically holding that  
[t]he Constitution empowers Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare of the United States.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Incident 
to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds, and has repeatedly employed the power “to further broad policy ob-
jectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the 
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.” The breadth 
of this power was made clear in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 
S.Ct. 312, 319, 80 L. Ed 477 (1936), where the Court, resolving a 
longstanding debate over the scope of the Spending Clause, determined that 
“the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for pub-
lic purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in 
the Constitution.”106 
The Court cited to Butler to reiterate that “objectives not thought to be 
within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be at-
tained through use of the spending power and the conditional grant of fed-
eral funds.”107 RLUIPA applies the same constitutional principles to local 
and state governments: those local and state governments that use federal 
funds must uniformly adhere to the federal government’s legitimate policy 
objectives to provide for the “General Welfare” by promoting religious 
freedom.108 
But, the Court in South Dakota did not afford the federal government a 
carte blanche to regulate local and state governments as they deemed fit. 
Instead, the Court also identified four requirements for Congress’s use of 
conditional spending to regulate state and local activities.109 RLUIPA meets 
each of these requirements.110  
First, the Court cited the Constitution, reminding, “the exercise of the 
                                                       
105 Id. at 206. 
106 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–207 (1987) (some citations omitted).   
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spending power must be in pursuit of the ‘general welfare.’”111 Likewise, 
“in considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general 
public purposes, courts should defer substantially to judgment of Con-
gress.”112 To be sure, even critics of RLUIPA have not asserted that the fed-
eral government’s policy to ensure religious freedom is not a legitimate 
general welfare purpose for American citizens. Likewise, to ensure uniform 
religious freedom across the states, it makes perfect sense to “defer substan-
tially to the judgment of Congress.”113  
Next, the Court required that, if Congress desires to place conditions on 
States’ receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously, enabling 
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of consequences of 
their participation.”114 Again, local and state governments have the right to 
reject federal funding if they wish to be exempt from RLUIPA. Should they 
choose not to participate in the federal government’s public policy initia-
tives, used to promote general welfare through uniform religious freedom, 
they may do so by simply rejecting federal funds. No enforcement mecha-
nism exists to require state and local governments to accept federal funding. 
 Third, the South Dakota Court held that conditions on federal fund-
ing might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the “federal interest in par-
ticular national projects or programs.”115 The Court cited to Ivanhoe Irriga-
tion District v. McCracken: “[T]he Federal Government may establish and 
impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and 
to the over-all objectives thereof.”116 The federal government has long had a 
legitimate interest in ensuring equal religious freedom throughout the coun-
try,117 and thus utilizing federal monies in the form of RLUIPA is clearly 
related to that federal interest.  
 Fourth, the Court held that the conditions cannot violate other provi-
sions, and finally, the provisions cannot amount to coercion, only induce-
ment.118 RLUIPA critics argue that RLUIPA violates the Establishment 
Clause, and that RLUIPA amounts to coercion because it automatically pre-
                                                       
111 Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 
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fers religious organizations to secular organizations.119 The next section 
demonstrates why both of these assertions are incorrect. 
 
D. RLUIPA Does Not Violate The Establishment Clause 
Contrary to assertions that RLUIPA violates other constitutional provi-
sions, the Supreme Court held in Cutter v. Wilkinson that RLUIPA does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.120 In Cutter, inmates filed suit alleging 
that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accommodate their ex-
ercise of “non-mainstream” religions.121 To be sure, Cutter focused only on 
the institutionalized-person prong of RLUIPA, with no discussion of the 
land use provision. Still, Cutter is significant to the land use provision for 
two reasons.  
First, in Cutter, the Supreme Court not only overturned the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s ruling that the portion of RLUIPA relating to incarcerated persons 
improperly advanced religion and thus violated the Establishment Clause, 
but the Court also did so unanimously.122 Second, although the argument 
that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause was also offered in Light-
house Community Church of God v. City of Southfield—a case that chal-
lenged the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land use provision—this argu-
ment was rejected, due in part to the precedent established in Cutter.123 The 
Lighthouse court held: 
…RLUIPA does not establish religion in violation of the First Amendment. 
RLUIPA does not favor or promote a certain specific religious message. In-
stead, RLUIPA frees groups and individuals to practice religion in whatever 
manner they choose. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court found that 
RLUIPA's provisions involving institutionalized persons do not establish reli-
gion in violation of the First Amendment. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 
(2005). The Supreme Court's reasoning in Cutter can be equally applied to 
those provisions of RLUIPA involving land use regulations. See also Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Maui County, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1014 (D. Haw. 2003) 
(finding that RLUIPA's provisions related to land use regulations do not violate 
the Establishment Clause).124 
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The Michigan court concluded that the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
the Cutter case “can be equally applied to those provisions of RLUIPA in-
volving land use regulations.”125 Incidentally, the court further held that 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enact 
legislation necessary to enforce the First Amendment's religious freedom 
guarantees—and that RLUIPA is therefore a constitutional enforcement 
mechanism.126 As mentioned earlier, the Lighthouse court also noted that 
“[a]ll circuit courts and almost all district courts which have considered this 
issue have found that RLUIPA is a constitutional use of congressional pow-
er under Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment.”127 
In 2007, Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck applied the 
Lemon Test, which analyzes the interaction of government and religion, to 
address the issue of whether RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause.128 
In Westchester, Defendant Mamaroneck appealed a lower court ruling that 
permitted Westchester to expand their daycare facility, arguing that the rul-
ing violated the Establishment Clause.129 In affirming the lower court’s rul-
ing, the court held: 
RLUIPA's land use provisions plainly have a secular purpose, that is, the same 
secular purpose that RLUIPA's institutionalized persons provisions have: to lift 
government-created burdens on private religious exercise. See Cutter v. Wil-
kinson. Similarly, the principal or primary effect of RLUIPA's land use provi-
sions neither advances nor inhibits religion. As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, a law produces forbidden effects under Lemon if "the government 
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence." Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 337, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 97 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1987). Under RLUIPA, the 
government itself does not advance religion; all RLUIPA does is permit reli-
gious practitioners the free exercise of their religious beliefs without being bur-
                                                       
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at *10; see Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 994–95 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 
897 (7th Cir. 2005); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Maui Cnty., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (D. Haw. 2003); Freedom Baptist 
Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 874 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
128 Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 355 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In determining 
whether a particular law violates the Establishment Clause, which provides in the First Amendment that 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,’ U.S. CONST. amend. I, we exam-
ine the government conduct at issue under the three-prong analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman. . . . Under Lemon, government action that interacts with religion must: (1) have a 
secular purpose, (2) have a principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not bring 
about an excessive government entanglement with religion.”) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612–13 (1971)). 
129 Id. at 343–44, 353. 
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dened unnecessarily by the government.130 
This distinction is crucial to understanding RLUIPA’s proper applica-
tion.  RLUIPA serves a secular purpose of ensuring discrimination does not 
occur against religious organizations; it does not by any means promote re-
ligion itself. 
 
E. RLUIPA Does Not Violate Federalism 
RLUIPA does not violate the principles of federalism, a fact numerous 
circuit courts have consistently reaffirmed.131 For example, in Lighthouse 
Institute for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, the court held that 
RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment 
reserves to the States those powers not enumerated in the Constitution. 
Since Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to its power enumerated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by necessity RLUIPA does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment … In conclusion, the Court finds that RLUIPA is not unconsti-
tutional.”132  
The Lighthouse Institute court cited numerous other circuit courts that ar-
rived at the same conclusion.133 For example, in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. 
Town of Surfside, two synagogues filed a RLUIPA suit against the Town of 
Surfside for passing a zoning ordinance that forbade churches and syna-
gogues from areas where private clubs and lodges were permitted.134 The 
Town of Surfside alleged that RLUIPA violated the principles of federalism 
and was not a valid congressional exercise afforded under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.135 In ruling for the synagogue plaintiffs, the court 
held: 
RLUIPA’s core policy is not to regulate the states or compel the en-
forcement of a federal regulatory program, but to protect the exercise of re-
ligion, a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s protec-
tion of the principles of federalism.136 
                                                       
130 Id. at 355 (citation omitted). 
131 See Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God, 2007 WL 30280, at *10; Westchester Day, 504 F.3d at 355; 
Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1242. 
132 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007). 
133 Id.; see Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1242; Westchester Day, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 239. 
134 Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1218–19. 
135 Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1242–1243; Westchester Day, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 239. 
136 Midrash, 366 F.3d  at 1243. 
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In short, the court held that under RLUIPA, the federal government is not 
compelling a federal regulatory program, but instead protecting a legitimate 
federal interest, ensuring uniform religious freedom. Therefore, RLUIPA 
does not violate the principles of federalism.  
 
F. RLUIPA Is Not a Universal Trump Card for Religious Organizations 
As it becomes increasingly clear that RLUIPA is permitted under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not violate the principles of federal-
ism, and does not violate the Establishment Clause, it is also important to 
note that RLUIPA is not a universal trump card for religious organizations 
to demand unreasonable zoning exceptions. In fact, courts have consistently 
applied RLUIPA in a measured form to ensure the precise aforementioned 
criticisms do not become realities.137 
For example, in 2008, Maryland’s highest court ruled for Baltimore 
County against a church in a RLUIPA case.138 The church, Trinity Assem-
bly of God of Baltimore City, filed suit against Baltimore County after zon-
ing officials rejected Trinity’s request to erect a sign substantially larger 
than the size zoning ordinances permitted.139 In ruling for Baltimore Coun-
ty, the court echoed the Board’s argument that “[t]o meet the ‘substantial 
burden’ standard, the government conduct being challenged must actually 
inhibit religious activity in a concrete way and cause more than a mere in-
convenience.”140 In holding that the government’s alleged RLUIPA viola-
tion was, in fact, a legal government act, the court held: 
In the present case, we hold that the Board correctly assessed the law re-
garding what constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise under 
the RLUIPA.  We also hold that the Board properly found that the impedi-
ment to Trinity in this case does not rise to the level of a substantial bur-
den….First, Trinity has not been substantially burdened “when the solution 
to a majority of [its] myriad constraints appears to lie within [its] con-
trol”.…Second, “[t]he burden on religious practice is not great when the 
                                                       
137 See, e.g., Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel For Baltimore Cnty., 
962 A.2d 404, 432 (Md. 2008); San Jose Christian Coll. v City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1036 
(9th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003), 
reh’g en banc denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24176; DiLaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 471 F.3d 
666, 669 (6th Cir. 2006). 
138 Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel For Baltimore Cnty., 962 A.2d 
404, 432 (Md. 2008). 
139 Id. at 404.  
140 Id. at 430–431 n.24. 
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government action . . . does not restrict current religious practice but rather 
prevents a change in religious practice”.…Moreover, the Board noted also 
that there was no “evidence to show that church attendance was falling as a 
result of the fact that there was no large sign to advertise church functions.” 
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that denial 
of a variance for Trinity’s proposed sign does not impose a substantial bur-
den on Trinity.141 
The Trinity case is certainly not the exception; it is one of several exam-
ples in which the court rejected a RLUIPA claim because the local or state 
government did nothing more than to enforce a neutral, non-discriminatory 
zoning provision.142 In fact, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have 
each held RLUIPA inapplicable for the same reason as the Trinity court: the 
challenged land use regulation did not impose a substantial burden on the 
religious organization in question.143  
These cases are of particular importance for several reasons. First, they 
demonstrate that it is possible to enforce local and state government zoning 
regulations without violating the Free Exercise Clause.144 Likewise, these 
cases demonstrate that RLUIPA does not invalidate state and local zoning 
regulations that are general laws with neutral applicability.145 Thus, these 
examples are perhaps the most convincing arguments against assertions that 
RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause, because they demonstrate that 
courts do not blindly validate RLUIPA claims, but do so on a case-by-case 
basis and only if the claim has objective merit. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
RLUIPA is a two-pronged act, signed into law in 2000, to ensure local 
and state governments do not infringe on the religious freedoms of institu-
tionalized persons or religious organizations. Since then, the “institutional-
ized persons” prong debate has been put to rest, as the Supreme Court unan-
imously ruled in Cutter v. Wilkinson that RLUIPA does not violate the 
                                                       
141 Id. at 430 (citing Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th 
Cir. 1990), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (applying the Free Exercise Clause)). 
142 See, e.g., San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004); Civil 
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc denied, 
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24176; DiLaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 471 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2006). 
143 See San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1036; Civil Liberties, 342 F.3d at 761; DiLaura, 471 F.3d 
at 669. 
144 San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1036; Civil Liberties, 342 F.3d at 761; DiLaura, 471 F.3d at 
669. 
145 San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1036; Civil Liberties, 342 F.3d at 76; DiLaura, 471 F.3d at 
669. 
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Establishment Clause. Still, critics assert that at least the land use provision 
of RLUIPA is an impermissible use of power outside the scope of Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, that it is not permitted among the Enumerat-
ed Powers of Congress, that it violates the Establishment Clause, and that it 
violates the principles of federalism. On the contrary, federal courts have 
repeatedly and uniformly held that Congress has the power under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce RLUIPA, that RLUIPA is legiti-
mate under Congress’s Enumerated Powers, that RLUIPA does not violate 
the Establishment Clause, and that RLUIPA does not violate the principles 
of federalism. Even the most active RLUIPA critics are appreciating these 
holdings, as the Department of Justice reports that “since June 2006, [it is] 
aware of only one land-use case and one institutionalized persons case that 
have even raised RLUIPA’s constitutionality as an issue.”146 
While critics continue to debate RLUIPA’s constitutionality, countless 
minority religious organizations, particularly American Muslims, serve as 
living examples of RLUIPA’s crucial role in ensuring equal treatment and 
religious freedom. As anti-Muslim campaigns gain strength, the number of 
anti-Islam hate groups continue to increase, and open opposition to mosque 
projects continue, RLUIPA’s need and service as a vanguard of religious 
freedom in America becomes even more apparent. As states continue to 
consider and pass anti-Shariah laws and elected officials continue to hold 
anti-Muslim views, RLUIPA only gains more relevance in protecting land 
use rights.  
In short, not only is RLUIPA constitutional, it is also absolutely neces-
sary to counter the “widespread pattern of religious discrimination in 
[America]” against American Muslims.147 RLUIPA ensures that the reli-
gious freedom principles that our Founding Fathers established in the eight-
eenth century continue to remain unmolested and at the forefront of Ameri-
can public policy as our nation grows into the twenty-first century. 
 
                                                       
146 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 36. 
147 City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997). 
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Appendix A: State Anti-Shariah/Foreign/Religious Law Statutes 
 
State Law Legislative    
Status*  
Banning What? 
Alabama SB 62 Active Shariah Law 
Alaska HB 88 Active Foreign Law 
Arizona HB 2582 Active All Religious 
Law 
Arkansas SB 97 Dead Foreign Law 
Florida SB 1294 Dead Foreign Law 
Georgia HB 45 Active Foreign Law 
Indiana HB 1078 Active Foreign Law 
Indiana SB 530 Active Foreign Law 
Kansas HB 2087 Enacted Foreign Law 
Louisiana Act 714 Enacted Foreign Law 
Michigan HB 4769 Active Foreign Law 
Mississippi HB 301 Dead Shariah Law 
Missouri HB 708 Active Foreign Law 
Nebraska LB 647 Active Foreign Law 
North Carolina HB 640 Active Foreign Law 
Oklahoma SQ 755 Enacted / Sus-
pended 
Shariah Law 
Pennsylvania HB 2029 Active Foreign Law 
South Carolina S 444 Active Foreign Law 
South Dakota HRJ 1004 Active Religious Law 
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*Dead = Proposal did not become law and is not active in the legislative 
process; 
Active = Proposal is progressing through the legislature but not a law 
yet (may mean stagnant); 
Enacted = Proposal passed both state legislatures, was signed by the 
governor, and is current state law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tennessee SB 1028 Enacted Shariah Law 
Texas HJR 57 Dead Religious 
Law 
Utah N/A Withdrawn Shariah Law 
Virginia HB 631 Active Foreign Law 
Wyoming HJR 8 Active Shariah Law 
